A Nuanced Lakatos Philosophy of Theology and Science by Kennard, Doug
The Proceedings of the International Conference 
on Creationism 
Volume 6 
Print Reference: Pages 31-42 Article 6 
2008 
A Nuanced Lakatos Philosophy of Theology and Science 
Doug Kennard 
Bryan College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.cedarville.edu/icc_proceedings 
 Part of the Life Sciences Commons, Physical Sciences and Mathematics Commons, and the Religion 
Commons 
DigitalCommons@Cedarville provides a publication platform for fully open access journals, 
which means that all articles are available on the Internet to all users immediately upon 
publication. However, the opinions and sentiments expressed by the authors of articles 
published in our journals do not necessarily indicate the endorsement or reflect the views of 
DigitalCommons@Cedarville, the Centennial Library, or Cedarville University and its employees. 
The authors are solely responsible for the content of their work. Please address questions to 
dc@cedarville.edu. 
Browse the contents of this volume of The Proceedings of the International 
Conference on Creationism. 
Recommended Citation 
Kennard, Doug (2008) "A Nuanced Lakatos Philosophy of Theology and Science," The Proceedings of the 
International Conference on Creationism: Vol. 6 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.cedarville.edu/icc_proceedings/vol6/iss1/6 
A Nuanced Lakatos Philosophy of Theology and Science
Doug Kennard, Ph. D., Biblical Studies Department, Bryan College, Dayton, TN 37321
Abstract
A Lakatos philosophy of science fosters nuanced precision within critical realism, recognizing that 
falsification of any theory (for example, evolution) does not occur without providing a better theory.
Imre Lakatos articulated a moderate foundational rational model of derivation in the philosophy 
of mathematics and science that utilized Peircian pragmatism to encourage its productivity and to 
make sense of paradigm change. Lakatos proposes a sophisticated falsification view that encourages 
helpful development, because, “There is no falsification before the emergence of a better theory.” 
Thus a creationist model needs to focus on crafting better theories or creationist models will never be 
seriously considered by the academy as a live option. Lakatos’ approach encourages a progressive 
orientation current with the latest warranted findings rather than clinging to a tradition. Justification 
for the theologian comes from exegesis and grounded philosophizing that contribute to a more 
nuanced understanding of an issue. The justification for the scientist comes from tested peer reviewed 
proposals that contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the issue.
Critical realism is better understood as Lakatos proposed than in Kuhn’s paradigm shift. In 
creationism, the Kuhnian radical shift in paradigms would: (a) encourage the creationist to give up 
because he lost the battle as the scientific world shifted from creationism to evolutionism or (b) seek 
naive falsification of the evolutionary theory. Whereas, a Lakatos theorist would recognize that a more 
nuanced model between the extremes might better reflect the data in creationism. So a better model 
than a Kuhnian paradigm shift would be a Lakatos’ approach illustrated by the contemporary rivalry 
among relativistic and quantum theories. A critical realist approach values recognizing the precise 
differences of these varied approaches, and crafting a nuanced method that reflects this sensitivity.
Examination will include the following methodological approaches to theology and science: 
Alister McGrath’s Bhaskerian approach, Nancey Murphy’s post-modern Lakatos’ approach, and my 
moderate foundational Lakatos’ approach.
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Introduction
In reaction to the enlightenment epistemologies 
in 1916, Roy Sellars proposed the view of “critical 
realism.” The view appreciates the empiricism 
of Locke and Newton and blends it with the 
mathematical rationalism of Descartes and Kepler 
and pragmatism of Peirce and James (Sellars, 1916, 
pp. 27, 66, 206). This locates a critical realist’s view of 
reality within an epistemic dualism, that is, an idea 
is not the reality for which it approximates (Drake 
et al, 1920, pp. 18–19, 158, 190; Sellars, 1916, pp. 11, 
17, 109, 262). Standing against idealism’s (like Plato, 
Berkley, Kant, and Process) and view’s dominated 
by passion (like romanticism, existentialism and 
other populist approaches), critical realism sees this 
real world and metaphysical beings as accessible to 
the human mind. Sellars claimed, “Truth is, then, 
a reflective qualification of those ideas, beliefs, and 
judgments which we regard as giving us knowledge 
about some sphere of reality” (Sellars, 1916, p. 277). 
He acknowledges that in this view, perception is 
subjective (Drake et al., 1920, pp. 3, 206; Sellars, 
1916, p. 14). However, as scientific realism this 
approach attempts to render the perception more 
precise (Sellars, 1916, pp. 26, 33, 62). To accomplish 
this increased precision, pragmatism is utilized to 
check the perception (Drake et al., 1920, pp. 35–81, 
157–60; Sellars, 1916, pp. 132–134, 164). “Truth is 
thus accepted and tested knowledge” (Sellars, 1916, 
p. 282). Moreland and Craig summarize the core 
tenets of such a scientific realism (Moreland & Craig, 
2003, p. 328): 
SR1: Scientific theories (in mature, developed 
sciences) are true or approximately true.
SR2: The central observational and theoretical 
terms of a mature scientific theory genuinely refer 
to entities in the world. These terms make existence 
claims.
SR3: Given two rival theories, it is in principle 
possible to have good reasons for thinking which 
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is more likely to be true or approximately true . . . 
conceptual relativism (what is rational for one person 
or group should not necessarily be so for another 
person or group since rationality itself is relative to a 
person, scientific community or theory) is false.
SR4: A scientific theory will embody certain 
epistemic virtues (simplicity, clarity, an absence of 
internal and external conceptual problems, predictive 
success, empirical accuracy, scope of relevance, 
fruitfulness in guiding new research, utilization of 
appropriate ways of explaining things . . .).
SR5: The aim of science is a literally true conception 
of the theory-independent external world.
Thus an outstanding trademark for the critical 
realist approach is increased precision and warrant 
for the views that they articulate.  
In the wake of Renaissance Humanism, evangelical 
theology tends to be proposed within commonsense 
realism. However, there are some critical realist 
theologians who have proposed a more nuanced 
approach toward God, which admits to subjectivity 
from one’s contexts and point of view. These critical 
realist theologians appreciate renaissance humanism 
at an even more precise level. For example, William 
G. T. Shedd acknowledged progressiveness within the 
discipline of theology that would be characterized as 
a discipline wide critical realism in his comments on 
“The first investigator is not so likely to strike upon the 
intrinsic constitution of a thing as the last one, because 
he has not the light of previous inquiries. Methods of 
investigation are continually undergoing correction 
and modification, and are thus brought closer to the 
organization of the object” (Shedd, n.d., vol. 1, p. 4). 
With the discipline of theology developing, theology 
should not be thought of as a static authoritative 
tradition or Kuhnian “paradigm.” Rather developing 
theology should be thought of as Lakatos’ “Research 
Programs” which undergo nuanced revolutionary 
change as theology proposals develop. This approach is 
more accurate description of theological development 
than viewing such development through a Kuhnian 
lens because with every new theological development, 
advocates of the outmoded positions remain in their 
earlier less-nuanced positions. For example, the 
radical shift in paradigms about which Thomas Kuhn 
wrote about in his Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
(Kuhn, 1962) are like the change from the view of 
the Ptolemaic universe (sun and everything revolves 
around the earth) to a Copernican universe (in 
the solar system the planets revolve around the 
sun). Theologically, this would be like the radical 
shift from Platonic to Aristotelian theology, under 
Thomas Aquinas. Whereas, a Lakatos theorist 
would recognize even as the weight of adherence 
from Platonic to Aristotelian theology shifted there 
remained advocates for both approaches, a condition 
which Kuhn would say was illegitimate, but in fact 
describes the reality. That is, many philosophical, 
theological, and traditional approaches advocated 
in the past still have contemporary advocates. 
Furthermore, many of these theological variants 
retain aspects of the previous philosophical approach 
within them as they moved on with a new philosophical 
base, as is evident by the resilience of such features as 
Platonic simplicity of God which continues to appear 
throughout many later theological approaches. So 
instead of monolithic change in the Kuhnian pattern 
it is better to recognize a Lakatosian approach which 
permits modest incremental changes within changing 
paradigms. That is, a better model for change than the 
Copernican model would be the contemporary rivalry 
among relativistic, quantum, and string theories in 
physics. A critical realist approach values recognizing 
the precise differences of these varied approaches, 
and crafting a nuanced method that reflects this 
sensitivity.
Among earlier evangelical theologians, perhaps 
only A. H. Strong opted for a more nuanced personal 
critical realist position. Strong affirms both: [1] that 
“the laws of our thought are laws of God’s thought and 
[2] that the results are normally conducted thinking 
with regard to God correspond to the objective reality” 
(Strong, 1907, vol. 1, p. 10, [] added for clarity). At the 
same time he conceded that “all knowledge is relative 
to the knowing agent; that is what we know, we know 
not as it is objectively but only as it is related to our 
senses and faculties” (Strong).
The philosopher-theologian Stuart Hackett 
clearly positioned himself within a critical realist 
epistemology, with his rational-empiricist Christianity 
(Hackett, 1957, pp. 37–175; 1984, 11–83; also Moser, 
1986, 1989). Hackett saw that moderate foundations 
provided the starting points for any legitimate world 
view. These foundations include: rational, empirical, 
and incorrigible contributions. 
(1) A few rational or self-evident foundations provide 
the structure of our knowledge, 
(2) empirical foundation of a person’s immediate 
awareness of his own states of consciousness largely 
provides the content of our knowledge. 
(3) Finally, incorrigibility (that is, whatever a person 
knows and cannot be convinced otherwise because it 
would plunge him into paralyzing skepticism if he 
were consistent with its denial), largely connects a 
person coherently with the essentials of their world 
view. 
(1) The rational foundations which he grants 
are: the laws of identity and contradiction, I think 
therefore I am, performative statements, and the 
definitional difference between related terms (like: 
cause and effect; and possible, actual and necessary). 
Hackett’s rational foundations join Lakatos’ rational 
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foundation of derivation in mathematics (Lakatos, 
1963–64, pp. 1–25). 
(2) Hackett’s empirical foundations provide for 
largely an analytical philosophic approach. From this 
modest base, he argues for the existence and nature 
of God and then builds up a theology and metaphysic 
from there. As a result of these arguments, 
(3) Hackett grants biblical authority and informs 
his world view from the Bible as part of an incorrigible 
foundation for his Christianity, philosophy, and 
theology. From these modest foundations, Hackett 
argues for the existence and nature of God and then 
builds up a theology and metaphysic from there. 
He sees God and the world through the lens of 
epistemological dualism so that there are ways from 
argument and experience to further warrant the 
belief system that is being built by the theologian to 
represent the reality that exists.  
Alister McGrath presents theological method 
as a critical realist. He often presents it as an 
empirically based pragmatic realism or when he adds 
mathematical derivation to it, he calls this method, 
“critical realism” (McGrath, 2001, pp. 71–77; 2002, 
pp. xv–xvi, 123–244, especially 188; also Lonergan, 
1972, p. 234; 1988, pp. 205–221; also van Huyssteen, 
1989, pp. 123–197). He sees that empirically based 
pragmatism is the foundation for this realism 
in the natural sciences, following Roy Bhasker’s 
scientific realism (Bhasker, 1986, 1997, 1998; Collier, 
1994; McGrath, 2002, pp. 257, 174–175). Bhasker’s 
approach while individually Kantian, is corporately 
Durkheimian with a collectivist conception of society 
which establishes the reality of social facts in an open 
system which grows (Bhasker, 1998, pp. 38–41, 41). 
McGrath works within this method where nature is 
interpreted as a socially mediated construct of science 
and theology about beings (McGrath, 2001, vol. 1, 
p. 4). However, I suspect that McGrath’s confidence 
in mathematical derivation provides a rational 
underpinning (foundation?) for some aspects of his 
model that Bhasker does not himself grant within his 
non-foundational approach. Through the community 
agreement, Bhasker calls his approach a necessary 
ontological realism, which for McGrath would 
preserve a necessary ontological theology (Bhasker, 
1986, p. 24). McGrath justifies this unitary approach 
to science and theology on the basis of the Christian 
doctrine of creation (McGrath, 2001, vol. 1, p. 21). 
He illustrates this methodology several times over, 
especially in physics. He rejects foundationalism for 
its lack of elegance, but admits that Paul Moser has 
nicely defended a moderate foundationalism (McGrath, 
2002, vol. 2, p. 24, 26–39; Moser, 1986, 1989). He then 
justifies his critical realism as against conventionalist 
approaches, which would be either anti-realist, 
theory dependent, or indebted to James pragmatism. 
McGrath develops a critical realism that engages 
the world at a variety of levels, each evaluated for its 
clarity and predictability. He extends this scientific 
method to theology as an attempt to behold reality 
communally, with theology as a scientific discipline 
in a critical realist methodology. Theology for him 
becomes a communal task of the collective wisdom 
that has won acceptance within the community 
(McGrath, 2003, vol. 3, p. 28). “Doctrine may thus be 
provisionally defined as communally authoritative 
teachings regarded as essential to the identity of the 
Christian community, in which the community tells 
itself and outsiders what it has seen, and what it has 
become in response to this vision” (McGrath, 2003, 
vol. 3, p. 28). However, McGrath admits that when 
it comes to heresy, there is an individual aspect to 
doctrine in order for the community to exclude the 
heretic (McGrath, 2003, vol. 3, p. 223). 
 McGrath’s strengths take his critical realism in 
two primary directions of increased precision: (a) 
issues of science and religion, and (b) church history. 
With a Ph.D. in molecular biophysics, he repeatedly 
contributes with precision to the integration of science 
and religion (McGrath, 1998a, 1999, 2001, 2002, 
2003). However, with his second Ph.D. in church 
history, he shows his precision in this area as well 
(1998b). 
Alan Padgett contributes significantly toward 
allowing theology and each science discipline to 
mutually contribute what they have to give within a 
critical realism.  
Once we grant that there are different sorts of 
schemes for explaining the same thing, and they do 
not reduce to each other, this raises the question of 
their interrelationship. Since the sort of explanation 
we have in mind is causal, these schemes postulate 
certain causal relationships that hold between things. 
They develop models for the nature and powers of 
things involved, their regular causal relations, laws 
describing the regularities in these relations, and 
general theories. What happens, it seems, is that 
some levels are more fundamental than others in the 
following sense: the accepted results of the scheme at 
the more fundamental level is used, and assumed, in 
the next level up. So particle physics is assumed in 
thermodynamics, and psychology and sociology are 
assumed in history (Padgett, 1996, 18–19; 2003).
Alan Padgett continues to develop that there is likely 
a two way-dialog between these more fundamental 
and higher order disciplines. Though he admits that 
sometimes in social sciences the more fundamental 
discipline may not be that clear, as may be the case 
with psychology and sociology.
Nancey Murphy recognizes this sort of higher order 
and foundational relationship and places theology 
as the highest order science but able to engage with 
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the other disciplines on down to the foundation 
(Murphy, 2002). That is, each of these disciplines are 
commensurable (able to be compared to each other) 
though their focus and scope are different. Within 
such a framework, theology has the broadest scope 
as well as distinctive focus. For example, alcoholism 
can be analyzed: (a) chemically on a level of chemical 
reactions, (b) biologically, on a level of genetic 
predisposition, (c) psychologically, as a defense 
mechanism such as avoidance, (d) sociologically, as a 
learned trait within families and social groups that 
destroys them, (e) ethically as a destructive vice, and 
(f) theologically as rebellious sin, from which one 
should repent to depend on God (Ephesians 5:18). 
Critical realism would recognize that each of these 
analyses is accurate and some demand a volitional 
change. 
Furthermore, Nancey Murphy proposes a critical 
realist theological method after the pattern of Lakatos 
philosophy of science (Murphy, 1990, pp. 51–81). Imre 
Lakatos articulated a rational model of derivation 
in the philosophy of mathematics and science that 
utilized Peircian pragmatism to encourage its 
productivity and to make sense of paradigm change 
(Lakatos, 1963–1964, pp. 1–25, 120–139, 221–243, 
296–342; 1970, pp. 91–195). Nancey Murphy suggests 
this method is the best process to explain how change 
in a theological product can occur while maintaining 
many of one’s other theological commitments. That is, 
this approach can be seen as a more precise analysis 
of paradigm change, showing that paradigms are 
not as monolithic as Kuhn had proposed, nor is data 
retrievable only from within a paradigm. One of the 
critiques of Kuhn is that those in one paradigm can 
not perceive or communicate with those in another 
paradigm and that clearly does not describe the 
way paradigm change occurs. As one paradigm is 
unraveling the other is building strength of congruity 
and comprehensiveness. Lakatos proposed that each 
study a person accomplishes becomes a “research 
program” that works along side others and can be 
judged as rival programs, whether progressive or 
degenerative (Lakatos, 1970, pp. 118–119). Lakatos 
proposes a sophisticated falsification view of religious 
language that encourages development.
Contrary to naïve falsification [like Kuhn], 
no experiment, experimental report, observation 
statement or well-corroborated low-level falsifiying 
hypothesis alone can lead to falsification. There is no 
falsification before the emergence of a better theory . . . 
Thus the crucial element in falsification is whether 
the new theory offers any novel, excess information 
compared with its predecessor and whether some 
of this excess information is corroborated (Lakatos, 
1970, pp. 119–120, 227).
Thus a creationist model needs to focus on crafting 
better theories rather than merely trying to falsify 
evolution or they will never be seriously considered 
by the academy as a live option. Attempts to falsify 
evolution will be simply considered as annoyances like 
mosquitoes from quacks like flat earthers. Lakatos 
countering quotes from Popper, compares Kuhn’s 
approach to his own.
While naïve falsification stresses “the urgency 
of replacing a falsified hypothesis by a better one,” 
sophisticated falsificationism stresses the urgency of 
replacing any hypothesis by a better one. Falsification 
cannot “compel the theorist to search for a better 
theory,” simply because falsification cannot precede 
the better theory (Lakatos, 1970, p. 122). 
So the creationist needs to work for better theories 
or the evolutionist (or alternative creationist) will not 
see creationism falsifying their approaches. Likewise, 
this approach encourages a progressive orientation of 
a positive theology model to keep theology current 
with the latest biblical and philosophically warranted 
findings rather than static to a tradition. This would 
encourage a theologian to follow the Bible wherever 
it leads, provided it is exegeted in a contextually 
sensitive manner. Likewise, the theologian should 
follow moderately foundationally grounded logic 
wherever it leads provided it does not counter clear 
biblical statements. That is, Lakatos’ approach is not 
so much a justification for theory choice, as much as a 
framework for making sense of how one should hold 
a theory. The justification for the theologian comes 
from exegesis and grounded philosophizing.
Lakatos has been criticized by Steve Barnett as 
not providing prescriptive criteria sufficient to make 
decisions on whether the programs are progressive 
or degenerative. That is, Barnett charges that 
the criterion is too subjective so that whether it is 
progressive or degenerative is only recognizable 
after the fact. Trial by error is the risk in pragmatic 
tests that the observer does not know whether 
verification or falsification will occur unless he 
submits his proposal to experiment. However, further 
confirmation by experiments is not a shot in the dark 
because warranted experiments lay down a trajectory 
that indicates further confirmation will likely obtain.
Even more, in theology this is not a defeater 
argument against the Lakatos’ method because 
it only provides a description for the quest for an 
epistemically better research program and the 
sociology for doing this task. That is, biological 
science’s observational data may be available without 
providing a prescriptive criteria or interpretive 
thrust, but the intelligent design movement would 
argue otherwise (Ratzsch, 2001). Likewise, theology 
also has a different data strain that includes its 
interpretive trust within it’s content. I think that the 
prescriptive criterion to choose a superior theological 
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option is provided in the form of data appropriated for 
a theological project. That is, rational derivation from 
foundations or transcendental arguments includes 
criteria of coherence to the rationally foundational 
and to a lesser degree coherency to the theological 
project provided it does not contradict any other 
strongly warranted feature of the world view. In my 
Classical Christian God, I grounded and framed 
out my theological program beginning with this 
approach (Kennard, 2002, pp. 11–86). However, most 
of the data appropriated for a theological project will 
be textual from the Bible. Such textual data has an 
interpretive thrust within it identifying how the 
interpreter should understand the data and whether 
it corresponds appropriately in a biblical theology to 
which the Bible contributes. Thus the Bible provides 
its criteria (of coherence and correspondence with 
the biblical text) for warranting theology. That is, we 
should use biblical texts to make the points that they 
are making in their context, rather than imposing 
upon them our theological agenda. Thus provided 
theology is congruent with the thrust of the biblical 
texts that speak to this issue, a theology warrants 
itself. In filling out my theology in the Classical 
Christian God, the thrust of the biblical text 
dominates the theological content, agenda, and thus 
provides the criteria for appropriateness within itself 
(Kennard, 2002, pp. 87–204). Thus in the analysis of 
a critical realist theological method, I must supply 
an analysis of the process of (a) hermeneutics, (b) 
biblical theology, and (c) how biblical theology truths 
contribute to systematic theology. My upcoming book, 
A Critical Realist’s Theological Method explains this 
process.
A number of the authors of GRUE! The New 
Riddle of Induction (Stalker, 1994) appeal for a 
skepticism to the method of science that is caused 
by the unboundedness of the investigation data (as 
well as the issue Barnett raised above) and thus the 
inability to complete a generalization with confidence 
that removes alternative subjective interpretations. 
This may at times be a legitimate critique in the 
empirical scientific condition when rival theories can 
not exclude the other theory as degenerate. However, 
theological science can sidestep this criticism for at 
least two reasons. First, the previous paragraph point, 
that the interpretation thrust is imbedded within 
the biblical text itself as the thrust of the speech-
act, which diminishes rival options as degenerative. 
Secondly, the biblical data on any doctrinal point is 
a self-contained body of texts within the canonical 
bounds of the Bible, so that generalizations can be 
made with regard to the whole. There is no fear of 
a larger sample overwhelming the sample studied 
to date, provided the generalization was made 
concerning the comprehensive set of biblical texts 
(properly understood in their contexts) that address 
this doctrinal point. Of course, with more information 
becoming available (like the find of the Dead Sea 
Scrolls) more can be understood about the context of 
biblical texts. However, archeologically open contexts 
while influential to inform interpretation possibilities, 
does not render an interpretation definitive because 
primarily the context for the biblical text is provided 
within the information in the biblical text itself. 
However, all science is not adrift in a lack of 
progressive clarity and unboundedness. Those sciences 
that are mathematically derived and available for 
nuanced falsification that have marshaled substantial 
repeated demonstration of their conclusions have also 
stepped beyond these criticisms. First, mathematical 
derivation, such as Newton provides for his three laws 
of motion orient the discipline to an already warranted 
option on its rational basis. Lakatos affirms a role 
for this mathematical derivation as a foundation 
(Lakatos, 1963–1964, pp. 1–25). Then a statistical 
analysis of repeated testing of these laws shows that 
they govern reality, provided conditions close to the 
ideal are met. If additional variables are added (like 
a thick medium or a resistant wind) then they can be 
factored in to take them into account as well. So these 
criticisms do not seem to tell against all forms of science 
either. This approach of mathematical derivation and 
empirical testing (Peircian pragmatism) is still being 
utilized as is apparent by the contribution of Steven 
Weinberg’s derivation and mathematical theory 
that unifies the weak and electromagnetic forces in 
an attempt for the unified field theory for the four 
forces (gravity, electromagnetism, strong and weak 
forces). This Peircian pragmatic testing is where 
Lakatos progressive research proposal is attempting 
to contribute.
Working within this critical realist approach, 
each theologian or scientist has several research 
programs. Some of their research programs serve 
as a personal hard core, which is central to their 
program. Auxiliary hypotheses that add information 
that allow the data to be related to the theory are 
conjoined to the core. Auxiliary hypotheses form a 
“protective belt” around the hard core because they 
are modified when falsifying data emerge. Lakatos 
admits that any theory can be saved from falsification 
by altering it somewhere (that is, a ceteris paribus 
clause) and these modifications would occur to this 
belt of auxiliary hypotheses. However, Lakatos 
incorporates a simplicity element from Duhem (1954); 
progressive affiliated hypothesis must intimately 
extend the previous hypothesis rather than merely 
by conjunction (Lakatos, 1970, p. 131). He calls this 
the “tacking paradox” and values a unified solution 
to problems rather than one that requires multiple 
contrary tacks like in a sail boat trying to sail close 
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into the wind. In my opinion the remainder of the 
unified field theory proposed in the esoteric string 
theory with at least ten dimensions has mired down 
in huge tact that have no explainable basis in reality, 
nor are they able to be tested empirically, so in my 
opinion this model stands as a real degenerative 
model, even though the mathematical equations 
unify it theoretically. At this point I don’t believe 
that the beauty of a model can save it from the lack 
of some degree of sophisticated falsification. In this 
methodical approach it is better to limit tacks to 
that which are testable within the reality that the 
discipline is attempting to describe. Within this 
method, any individual may be researching several 
auxiliary hypotheses within a largely resilient world 
view, surrounding the individual’s hard core theology 
and science.  
Murphy describes such a research program as “a 
series of complex theories whose core remains the 
same while auxiliary hypotheses are successively 
modified, replaced, or amplified in order to account 
for problematic observations” (Murphy, 1990, p. 59). 
A program is progressive if the internal features 
are predictive of novel facts, and correspond to 
the full range of data from the biblical text in a 
congruent manner. Contrasting to this, a program is 
degenerative if it does not take recognized data into 
account and responds with ad hoc face saving devices. 
Such degenerative techniques become self-stultifying. 
The relative power of the research program has to do 
with its ability to increase scientific or theological 
knowledge.  
In science a similar approach can be used within 
the framework provided by the theological method. 
Therefore, biblically grounded theology, with rational 
and mathematical derivation provides the grid of 
coherency with which scientific options should be 
considered. Then scientific Lakatos research programs 
can be configured within this framework. Progressive 
programs are those which are empirically coherent 
and congruent to all the data available to make a 
responsible proposal. This is similar to the rational 
criteria that William Bartley provides to eliminate 
error, with the additional role of Bible and theology 
added. Bartley’s criteria for rational control are 
(Bartley, 1964, p. 158; also echoed by van Huyssteen, 
1989, p. 42):
(1) The control of logic: the question whether a 
given theory is logically consistent.
(2) The control of sensory perception: the question 
whether a theory is empirically falsifiable through 
sensory perception.
(3) The control of the theory of science: the question 
whether a given theory is in line or in conflict with 
other scientific hypotheses and with the formulation 
of problems in philosophy of science as such.
(4) The control of the problem: the question of which 
problem a given theory is supposed to solve, and of 
whether a given theory is successful in its solution of 
that problem.
Furthermore, increased confidence in a progressive 
model is obtained by the most comprehensive 
pragmatic proposal (without arbitrarily complexity) 
that best predicts and repeatedly demonstrates itself 
in testing further data. Ernan McMullin, in his 
presidential address to the American Philosophical 
Association argued for fruitfulness of epistemic 
understanding as indicating a better theory, similar 
to this Lakatos’ view.
The rationality of science can be philosophically 
justified. Here I disagree with Kuhn. What 
philosophers of science have labored so long to show is 
that such values of fertility are appropriate criterion of 
theory. Their arguments are in a broad sense logical 
or epistemological (McMullin, 1984, p. 57).
Using this approach, repeatable science, as in the 
making of chemical compounds, shows its progressive 
hypotheses to be strongly warranted in Peircian 
pragmatism. Whereas, in non-repeatable science (like 
biology and geology) the fruitfulness of prediction 
contained in a progressive hypothesis warrants 
itself until sufficient data challenges this reigning 
proposal to be considered degenerative. To the extent 
that equally warranted rival proposals explain the 
data, the scientist should be tentative about these 
hypotheses within his discipline.
Such a Lakatos’ approach governs community 
theology as well. A group’s tradition is made up of 
the commonness of those individuals in this group. 
This means that what the group agrees upon and 
considers essential becomes the group’s hard core. Any 
tradition grants that certain affirmations possess an 
undeniable claim as a hard core of one’s world view. So 
for any group that has defined a hard core doctrinal 
statement, a denial of such a feature of the hard core 
could be considered to be heresy, whereas progressive 
development of this hard core need not be considered 
to be heresy. Actually, Lakatos would urge us not to 
identify heresy as denial of communal hard core, for 
“it still has the right to exist,” allowing the weeds to 
grow among the fruitful theology (Lakatos, 1999, 
p. 379; Matthew. 13:29, 38–43). However, in theology 
to challenge a feature of a group’s hard core runs the 
risk of being considered heretical. Such a challenge 
is not likely to succeed unless the proposed feature, 
denying an aspect of the hard core, is: (a) grounded 
elsewhere in the group’s hard core or (b) that a clear 
argument can be marshaled that the group’s hard 
core feature is itself contradictory, that the proposal 
is intended to replace.   
In physics, such progressive Lakatos research 
programs would be the rival theories like that of 
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relativity and quantum, which both excel their 
Newtonian classical physics predecessor in certain 
aspects of precision and predictability. Lakatos urges 
against letting such research programs become 
normal science as a world view.
One must never allow a research program to 
become a Weltanschauung, or a sort of scientific rigour, 
setting itself up as an arbiter between explanation 
and non-explanation, as mathematical rigour sets 
itself up as an arbiter between proof and non-proof. 
Unfortunately this is the position which Kuhn tends 
to advocate: indeed, what he calls “normal science” is 
nothing but a research programme that has achieved 
monopoly. But, as a matter of fact, research programs 
have achieved complete monopoly only rarely and then 
only for relatively short periods, in spite of the efforts 
of some Cartesians, Newtonians, and Bohrians. 
The history of science has been and should be a 
history of competing research programmes (or, if 
you wish “paradigms”), but it has not been and must 
not become a succession of periods of normal science: 
the sooner competition starts, the better for progress 
(Lakatos, 1990, p. 155).
This results in the essential ingredient for a living 
science to be in continuous development. This issue of 
“normal” theology and progressiveness of the discipline 
will be explored at greater depth within my book, A 
Critical Realist’s Theological Method. There I argue 
that rival traditions (Grand Tradition, Orthodox, 
Roman Catholic, Reformation Founders and Biblical 
Theology, Critical theology, majority Evangelicalism 
with Pietism, and Post-Modern) all claimed this 
normal status and yet all of them have living advocates. 
Such a normalcy approach diminishes dialog between 
these traditions, isolating their advocates to their 
own traditions. It would be better if these traditions 
listened to each other, since they often claim to value 
similar aspects (like biblical authority) and what any 
tradition considers appropriate progressiveness could 
help other traditions think through the implications 
of its values. I think that Lakatos more precisely 
explains and better encourages how this process is 
done in theology, than the tendency to normalize one’s 
own tradition.  
Unfortunately many in theology view the research 
programs as more Kuhnian monolithic traditions, 
either as a grand Christian tradition or as resolving 
toward the favor of our community’s tradition, and 
against all other rival traditions. Such a “normal 
tradition” view does not help theology as a discipline 
to progress or keep current with exegetical findings 
(Lakatos, 1990, 173–175). However, in my book A 
Critical Realist’s Theological Method, I also show 
that such a Kuhnian normal tradition view is not 
accurate to the facts of the history of theology either. 
For example, with each new traditional framework 
the older tradition remained with adherents, resulting 
in several rival traditions continuing as Lakatos had 
developed that they would. Additionally, the rival 
traditions sometimes incorporate features at odds with 
their stated assumptions. A Lakatos method better 
makes sense of this inconsistency as a degenerative 
feature rather than as heresy.
In a “normal” theology or Kuhnian approach, 
any deviation from the tradition becomes heresy. In 
a Lakatos approach, degenerative and progressive 
features of the affiliated hypothesis which an 
individual or group maintains around their hard core 
would not be heresy. Though, obviously degenerative 
features would be advantageous to grow beyond even 
though they are not heretical. Likewise, progressive 
proposals would be advantageous for a tradition to 
embrace if it is interested in keeping current with its 
disciplines or thinking through its implications.
I think that in the science of origins a similar 
condition occurs between the evangelical populous 
Creationism and critical Romantic Evolutionism. 
The Kuhnian approach tends to bifurcate into two 
camps, ruling out the possibility of a nuanced more 
accurate way between them. A Lakatosian approach 
would encourage a more nuanced research program 
wherever the data stream would lead to truth. One 
example, is Todd Wood’s studies of baraminology, 
which I briefly identify here in a Lakatosian critical 
realistic methodology (Wood, 2005). Todd Wood is 
a realist in that he starts with taxum of observed 
characteristics but tries to prevent personal bias 
by approaching each animal through a multiplicity 
of frameworks set forward by other researchers 
and evaluates them all for their similarities and 
differences (baraminic distance). He seems to be 
utilizing a strategy pioneered by Robert Sokal and 
Peter Sneath (Sokal & Sneath, 1963) but appropriated 
and nuanced further by Wood to float a robust method 
with a progressive research program that reproduces 
predictable results.  
Those who have charted the landscape before Dr. 
Wood framed this field of baraminology within a 
critical realist mindset, if not always within a Lakatos 
approach. However, a brief summary of the development 
before Wood also indicates that the discipline should 
be understood to have grown as Lakatos described 
progressive development to occur. For example, in the 
1940s Frank Marsh defined the term baramin (off 
the Hebrew: bara/creation + min/kind) and floated a 
nuanced theory which permits changes within a kind 
but not beyond a kind (Brand, 1997; Marsh, 1944, 
p. 24; Wood, 2003a, pp. 1–12, 2003b). In 1990, Walter 
ReMine proposed a discontinuity strategy to exclude 
baramins from each other. Out of his work came more 
specific terminology: (a) holobaramin or “a complete 
set of organisms related by common descent,” (b) 
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monobaramin or “a group containing only organisms 
related by common descent,” (c) apobaramin or “a 
group which contains all ancestors and descendents of 
any of its members, but contain subgroups that are not 
related to each other,” and (d) polybaramin or “a group 
of organisms not sharing an ancestor or descendent 
with any organism outside the group” (ReMine, 1990, 
pp. 207–213, 1993). In 1993, Siegried Scherer 
also proposed a “basic type” of life for the German 
creationist group Word and Knowledge that advanced 
the classification category into scientific verification 
(Scherer, 1993, pp. 11–30). Also in 1990, Kurt 
Wise fused ReMine’s terminology and successive 
approximations with: (a) Scripture as a source, 
(b) discontinuity systematics and (c) Basic Type 
biology, which fusion meant an advance in scientific 
verification without reference to verifying ancestry 
(Wise, 1990, pp. 345–358, 1992, pp. 122–137, 2002). 
As such, Wise and Wood utilize the following nuanced 
terminology to distinguish baramins from each other: 
(a) monobaramin as “a group of organisms which is not 
completely divided by a phyletic discontinuity, but may 
or may not be separated from all other organisms by 
phyletic discontinuities,” (b) polybaramin as “a group 
of organisms divided by at least one discontinuity,” 
and (c) apobaramin as “separated from all other 
organisms by phyletic discontinuity, but may not be 
divided by at least one phyletic discontinuity.”
Personally for me in theology, each section of one 
of my theological papers, chapters or books also 
becomes a new research program in a Lakatosian 
sense. Usually, these programs are not rivals in 
my theology but serve to compliment other studies 
that deal with similar issues. These complimentary 
relations are evident in Murphy’s phrase, “Philosophy 
of religion without theology is empty; theology without 
philosophy of religion is blind” (Murphy, 1990, p. xii). 
As with Murphy, my philosophy and theology are 
interpenetrated (Kennard, 2002). However, to this I 
would add a second phrase, theology is impotent with 
regard to authority unless it is reflective of biblical 
theology, and biblical theology is impotent with regard 
to authority unless it is reflective of the biblical text 
in its context. I choose a critical realist methodology 
for my theology for its precise sight and a biblically 
theologically driven theology for its retention and 
clarity of the biblical message and authority. 
Murphy admits “it is conceivable that a theological 
research program could be built up from the bottom 
(that is, ‘induction’ from data)” [as I am trying to 
do] but she concludes from her experience “that 
theologians need an organizing idea before they start” 
(Murphy, 1990, p. 184). Perhaps my organizing idea 
is to let contextual biblical exegesis and grounded 
philosophizing speak clearly what they have to give. 
That is, honestly letting the available data speak 
with its own voice from its context. She suggests that 
she would start with “a minimal doctrine of God. 
including, say, the Trinitarian nature of God, God’s 
holiness, and God’s revelation in Jesus” (Murphy, 
1990). Furthermore, if she were to produce a 
systematic theology, she admits that she would find a 
place for at least two important auxiliary hypotheses: 
(a) something like Edwards theory regarding the 
validity of signs of the Holy Spirit, and (b) a doctrine 
of revelation based on Paul’s account of the gifts of the 
Holy Spirit (Murphy, 1990, p. 187). These are features 
I would include as well.
My theological method can be modestly grounded 
in the philosophical manner of Stuart Hackett but 
most of the content of my theological method actually 
is framed by biblical theology using a Lakatos method 
to inductively describe the biblical texts through 
a hermeneutical spiral. Consistent with Lakatos’ 
mathematical derivation a foundational rational 
tightness is permitted (as Hackett provides or as I 
use, as is evident in chapters 2 and 3 of The Classical 
Christian God, where I deduce and induce the existence 
and some attributes of God philosophically; Kennard, 
2002, pp. 11–62). David Clark advocates a similar 
moderately foundational Lakatosian theological 
method (Clark, 2003, pp. 82, 161–163, 304).
I recognize that often I do not need to investigate my 
foundations. I grant Hackett’s and Moser’s moderate 
foundations but I don’t think that they get you very far 
theologically. So in many ways my theology primarily 
rests upon my incorrigible awareness of my basic 
beliefs. These high priority incorrigible basic beliefs 
include:
(1) A theistic God exists that we can know which 
we identify with the trinitarian God of the Bible.
(2) The Bible itself is God’s authoritative revelation 
and can be understood clearly through normal human 
means of interpretation.
(3) The tools of knowing a reality beyond myself 
are accessible to us without substantial deception 
even though they involve subjectivity.  
(4) Though I allow my perspective to have priority 
for me, I value others’ perspectives in community as 
corroborating or challenging my own.
(5) The Bible portrays a salvation message which 
I and a historical community of “Christians” may 
appropriate.
(6) This core salvation message for Christians at 
least includes God graciously providing everlasting 
life and inheritance in Kingdom on the basis of what 
God and Christ are and accomplish, which without 
Their effort would leave humans damned at an 
eschatological judgment.
(7) I have the relationships (wife, family, colleagues, 
students, and otherwise) that I have. 
Some of these beliefs are layered (6 depends upon 
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5 which depends upon 2, and 7 depends upon 3) 
but these are helpful to clarify my particular basic 
orientation for my web of belief. Upon these basic 
beliefs (and moderate foundations beneath some of 
them) my subsequent biblical theology studies are 
framed as Lakatos research programs that fill out 
my theological musings. Each of these chapters of 
this book and the other books which I have written 
serve as these auxiliary hypotheses in the whole of 
my theology.  
Furthermore, when I am framing a hypothesis, 
I find that a communal appraisal of my colleagues 
is helpful to help me to be clear and to balance my 
subjectivity by their own. But most of these hypotheses 
begin with individual exegetical studies, which I 
acknowledge I also approach as a critical realist. In 
these studies, I try to be as clear as the text is clear 
and to be as ambiguous as the text is ambiguous. 
This critical realist approach has been appropriated 
into contemporary hermeneutics by moderate 
evangelicals working with the historical Jesus. These 
wish to express critical realism’s hermeneutical spiral 
with precision and find value in allowing epistemic 
categories to inform hermeneutical ones (Kennard, 
1999, pp. 57–58, 124–125, 133–134). That is, the 
textual data is observed by interpreter, such that they 
float a proposal for the meaning of a text that is then 
checked by comparing it to the details present in the 
text itself. Then the process is repeated drawing closer 
and closer to what the text actually says in itself. This 
hermeneutical process will be described more fully in 
the chapter “A Thiselton-Ricoeur Hermeneutic” later 
in this book.
Summary
I have obvious allegiances among these philosophical 
frameworks for the reasons presented here. Namely, 
I am most committed to biblical theology, which is 
the biblical side of the renaissance humanistic root. 
Beyond this, I also approach things with precision as 
a critical realist. This means that my philosophy is a 
conglomeration of a range of philosophers developed 
and affirmed above.  
The features of this critical realist philosophical 
method can be briefly summarized by a metaphor of 
a tree that identifies these techniques with greater 
certainty or plausibility should be given privilege of 
preferential place in framing a worldview, theology, 
and science. Returning to this tree metaphor 
identified in the introduction chapter will help clarify 
where contributions fit, contributing to my worldview 
and method for theology and science. I ground the 
place of my worldview with moderate foundational 
roots from: (a) rationalism (like: law of identity, 
law of noncontradiction, “I think therefore I am,” 
and performative language), (b) empiricism (like 
immediate sensations), and (c) incorrigible (basic 
beliefs). I allow certain knowledge of mathematical 
derivation and rationalism (for example, ontological 
argument) to frame the trunk of my epistemic tree. 
The important weight bearing branches are then 
framed by empiricism which further confirms itself 
by rational argument (for example, cosmological 
argument, teleological argument) and by Peircian 
pragmatism (for example, exegesis by hermeneutical 
spiral, testable science, and historical study from 
evidence). Preferred among this empirically based 
Peircian pragmatism is a hermeneutical spiral of 
well attested peer reviewed exegesis of Scripture 
because it possesses divine authority and the text’s 
interpretive thrust is within the text itself giving it 
a distinct edge over empirical observation of other 
media (compare forthcoming book, Kennard, A 
Critical Realist’s Theological Method). This priority 
would insist on theology and science to be nested 
within this biblicism. So a divinely inspired creation 
account should be given preferential place in framing 
issues of origins and a peer reviewed warranted 
exposition expressing those biblical sentiments 
should as well. Close behind this in credibility is peer 
reviewed Peircian pragmatically tested empirical 
science. Of course tentative exegesis and promising 
but not verified Peircian pragmatic science should be 
held more tentatively. Thus warranted science can 
affect the exegesis of texts, such as in a Copernican 
solar system the biblical phrases of the “sun rises 
and sets” should be understood phenomenologically 
as that of appearance while the earth spins on its 
axis and revolves around the sun. Such tentativeness 
within theology and science, should move this 
research program within its discipline to a more 
peripheral place of the medium branches of the tree, 
and should be governed by a Lakatos’ method with 
its sophisticated falsification. Smaller more tentative 
branches can be governed by James’ pragmatism, 
which should fit within and not contradict the 
already placed warranted peer reviewed exegesis, 
theology and science. Even Dewyian pragmatism 
could be given some place among non-moral twigs of 
the tree that do not contradict those branches framed 
by epistemology, exegesis, theology and science. 
Peripheral place of small twigs and leaves should be 
given to: phenomenological, aesthetic, intuitional, 
and existential strategies. None of these peripheral 
options should displace, nor be permitted to overrule 
the warranted peer reviewed exegesis, theology and 
science. However, some of the contributions in this 
peripheral area can be quite significant. For example, 
my phenomenological commitment to be involved with 
Boy Scouts with my sons has certainly colored my life 
in a major way. These peripheral areas of the tree’s 
canopy also provide a sense of the whole big picture 
D. Kennard 40
and vitality, which are very important for life. I rarely 
find existentialism bounded by the concerns of a 
biblical world view except in perhaps something like: 
Soren Kierkegaard’s reflections from the Synoptics or 
Abraham, or Paul Ricoeur’s metaphors reflecting the 
biblical text. If such a realist externalistic epistemology 
provided limits for existentialism, I would certainly 
wish to retain existentialism’s passion for authentic 
living. Thus I advocate a passionate quest for truth 
within these epistemic and methodological means.
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